The NDIA Trusted Microelectronics Joint Working Group enables government and industry to jointly address critical dependencies between microelectronics components, systems security and information assurance.
Obtaining Trusted and trustable leading-edge microelectronics is critical to maintaining the U.S. military’s technological advantage. As consolidations and the migration offshore of integrated circuit design and manufacturing capabilities continue, the defense industry faces increasing challenges to obtain those critical leading-edge components.
An NDIA industrial working group with members of government, industry, non-profits, and Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs) has been formed to address the microelectronics issues that could impact the Department of Defense’s access to the Trusted and trustable microelectronics needed to sustain its military technical advantage.
The specific goal of the Trusted Microelectronics Joint Working Group (TM JWG) is to facilitate industry and government interaction in areas related to microelectronics supply to confirm areas of concern and collaboratively develop mitigation strategies. Such interactions are intended to ensure trusted systems for the defense and national security systems through an exchange of information and an interchange of views between defense industry, university, research centers, government and military representatives.
The working group will begin with the description below that may evolve or narrow to align with members’ goals, within the limitations for government-industry collaboration:
1. What are the microelectronics capabilities needed by defense contractors to maintain our technical advantage, both now and in the future? Are there ways to quantify the value of hardware performance in the context of systems? Are there new hardware paradigms on the horizon that could be disruptive?
2. What are the potential consequences of China’s semiconductor indigenous investments to the U.S. defense microelectronics industrial base? What is the likely impact of losing access to Trusted supplier base or trustable components in the future? What are the concerns regarding defense industry access to commercially available technologies? What could be done and how much would it cost?
3. Explore the concept of assurance and risk in using parts not manufactured by a DMEA accredited Trusted flow. What are recommended methods for achieving confidence and assurance? What are the limitations? How much will it cost to implement?
4. What options exist for obtaining Trusted and trustable defense systems components from the projected future supplier base, including design approaches, fabrication approaches, and new concepts?