

# **A TECHNOLOGY-ENABLED NEW TRUST APPROACH**

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
Dr. William Chappell

Director, DARPA Microsystems Technology Office (MTO)

NDIA Trusted Microelectronics Workshop

August 17, 2016






MTO



*Artist's concept*



## Role of DARPA MTO





# DoD faces unique security challenges in protecting its microelectronics against advanced nation-states

## Fabrication & Assembly



### Potential Attacks

Malicious insertion  
Fraudulent products  
Loss of CPI  
Poor quality  
Reliability failures  
Loss of access




Courtesy: extremetech.com

### Overproduction & Test Fails




Courtesy: Daily Mail, Shutterstock

### Hardware or IP theft




Courtesy: NSWC CRANE

### Counterfeiting



Courtesy: NSWC CRANE

### Cloning



Courtesy: cse.psu.edu

### Design Compromise



Courtesy: IEEE Spectrum

### Reliability Compromise




Courtesy: IDC Manufacturing Insights and Booz Allen analysis

### Supply Chain Risk





# Leading-edge microelectronics offer specific, military-relevant advantages to DoD



Data from ISSCC papers 2010 – 2013  
and "Energy Efficient Computing on Embedded and Mobile Devices" on nVidia.com




## Example ASICs under development could deliver revolutionary capabilities to the warfighter

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- **ACT** Capture unprecedented volumes of RF data at 64Gs/sec for next-gen arrays
- **CLASIC** Distinguish and classify RF signals for 180 hours on a cellphone battery
- **CLASS** Disguise and dynamically vary signals for inexpensive LPI/LPD comms
- **DAHI** 10x higher dynamic range arbitrary waveform generator for EW solutions
- **ReImagine** Collect different data in a single camera frame with a reconfigurable ROIC
- **RF-FPGA** A software-defined front end that works for 20GHz or below
- **SHIELD** Verify the authenticity of components at every point in the supply chain
- **SPADE** Build trusted circuits through 3D integration
- **UPSIDE** Enable real-time machine learning for object recognition on UAV



## Example ASICs under development could deliver revolutionary capabilities to the warfighter




### ACT

- Capture unprecedented volumes of RF data at 64Gs/sec for next-gen arrays
- Leverage the world's best digital beamforming system

*32nm SOI vs. 14nm FinFet*

### SHIELD

Verify the authenticity of components at every point in the supply chain



ACT – Arrays at Commercial Timescales



## Example ASICs under development could deliver revolutionary capabilities to the warfighter



### ReImagine


- Achieve full battlespace awareness with a single reconfigurable ROIC
- Simultaneously collect diverse data types from multiple regions of interest

14nm CMOS



### SHIELD

Verify the authenticity of components at every point in the supply chain

SOA digital ROIC pixel layout using 65 nm CMOS



25  $\mu\text{m}$




14 nm CMOS pixel with computation

Images courtesy: MIT Lincoln Laboratory

Source: Realistic infrared sequence generation by physics-based infrared target modeling for infrared search and track Sungho Kim ; Yukyung Yang ; Byungin Choi Opt. Eng. 49(11), 116401 (November 22, 2010). doi:10.1117/1.3509363



## Example ASICs under development could deliver revolutionary capabilities to the warfighter




### SHIELD

- Ensure the authenticity of genuine military electronic components
- Tag electronics at low cost with an encrypted 100µm x 100µm ASIC

14nm CMOS

### SHIELD

Verify the authenticity of components at every point in the supply chain




SHIELD - Supply Chain Hardware Integrity for Electronics Defense






The semiconductor market sustains a large ecosystem, with many leading-edge firms operating within the United States






DoD will have to collaborate with the multinational semiconductor firms with leading-edge capabilities





## Reliance on trusted suppliers can limit potential partners, yielding few options for trusted access to leading-edge CMOS




	Foundry Choices	Process node for leading-edge products	Design-to-chip turnaround time
Commercial	Multiple global options	14nm – 10nm	9-10 months (400 engineers)
DoD	One strategic partner	65nm – 32nm	2-3 years (10 engineers)



# It is the right time for DoD to reflect on its strategy


**Today:** DoD relies on a single, sole-source supplier for leading-edge microelectronics

**Tomorrow:** Technology-driven security techniques can enable new DoD options for acquiring state-of-the-art, commercial microelectronics





# Selective application of countermeasures can demonstrate "trust through technology" for a representative device



To ensure security and to leverage the globalized supply chain, DARPA and other agencies are developing a technology-enabled portfolio of protections.






The DARPA solution is to provide a menu of hardware security options that can be selectively applied based on need

			Microelectronics Security Threats				
			Loss of information	Fraudulent products	Loss of access	Malicious insertion	Quality and reliability
High Government Intervention ↑	Protection	Program					
	Government-proprietary	Other	●				
	Fine Disaggregation and Transience	TIC (IARPA)	●	●	●	●	
		VAPR	●				
	Functional Disaggregation	SPADE	●			●	●
		DAHI	●		●	●	
		CHIPS	●		●	●	●
	Obscuration and Marking	CRAFT			●		●
		eFuses	●			●	
		SHIELD	●	●			
	Verification and Validation	IRIS		●		●	●
TRUST			●		●		

● Primary Impact ● Secondary Impact




# We've adapted to the end of Dennard's Law but are at an inflection point



**Post-Dennard, we lose the free exponential improvements in computing cost, speed, and power from improvements in fabrication technology.**




# Moore's Law has allowed the military to increasingly depend on FPGAs





The end of Moore's Law is leveling the playing field, meaning now is the time to focus on ASIC access and specialization

## Trust through technology



Acquisition personnel can selectively apply protections based on a component's criticality, the risks faced, and the need to access leading-edge technologies.



[www.darpa.mil](http://www.darpa.mil)