NDIA Supply Chain Workshop
28 February 2017

Team #5
Acquisition of Urgent & Emergent Requirements
5. Acquisition in Support of Urgent Requirements

“DoD’s highest priority is to provide warfighters involved in conflict or preparing for imminent contingency operations with the capabilities urgently needed to overcome unforeseen threats, achieve mission success, and reduce risk of casualties.” DoDI 5000.02 2/2/2017

We are the program management office (PMO) responding to a combatant commanders’ urgent need to provide a quick reaction capability that can be fielded within two years and within the cost threshold of an ACAT I program. We have been tasked to apply the urgent capability acquisition process to rapidly discover, develop and deliver the capability that satisfies the urgent and emergent need of the COCOM. Our focus is the early planning on how best to satisfy the requirement by implementing the urgent/rapid acquisition process and identifying the inherent risks and trade-offs. Additionally, we will address the post fielding support strategy for the COCOM solution to either program maturation (e.g. program of record) or disposition.
COCOM XX has identified a critical operation requirement due to increased enemy threat and engagement on the distribution lines of communication in the mountainous regions of the AOR. The development of an unmanned ground or aerial delivery system to defeat the insurgents’ successful use of roadside Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) against ground convoys in the mountainous region prompted the COCOM to release an Urgent Universal Needs Statement (UUNS). In September 2015 that challenged the COCOM to explore alternative means of combat re-supply to remote Forward Operating Bases (FOB) and Combat Outposts (COP). Six months following the release of the UUNS, a technology demonstration conducted by the COCOM Warfighting Laboratory at Dugway Proving Ground, Utah yielded astonishing results the vision of unmanned aircraft systems conducting re-supply missions on today's battlefield and into the future was far closer to reality than most realized. In addition to getting trucks off the road, the CUAS will considerably augment COCOM aviation assault support helicopters by providing critical combat re-supply to remote FOBs and COPs in mountainous regions. By taking the pilot out of the aircraft, commanders will have greater flexibility to re-supply.
1. What are the sustainment risks/issues associated with your scenario? (List in priority)

1. Not Fully tested
2. Associated requirements not defined
3. Outcome not defined
4. Lack of repair parts to support maintenance
5. Insufficient training and skills to repair
6. Commonality of fuel
7. System vulnerability
8. Failure to understand the complete supply chain – parts integrity, cataloging
9. Weak points in the Supply Chain – Distribution Nodes
10. Commonality of transportation interface (pallet, JMIX)
11. Availability of resources
2. *What proactive sustainment activities would help mitigate risks or resolve issues?*

1. Understand your Supply Chain
2. Determine what spares you need
3. Provide trained maintainers
4. Earlier coordination between systems integration and Logistics discipline (DLA Parts supplier support)
5. Develop performance support contract - buy outcomes-
6. Sole Source for follow-on support
7. Modify the requirements (lower the standard of performance – Lift/distance)
8. Parallel development of capability
9. Reduce the demand
10. Mitigate technical risk through evolutionary acquisition
3a. **Understand your Supply Chain:**

*a) List the information you need during Acquisition phase to plan for sustainment.*

*What do you want?*
*When do you want it?*
*Where is the current expertise?*
*Who are the available sources of supply?*
*What is the budget?*

*b) List any anticipated systemic constraints or barriers.*

*Budget*
*Time/Schedule (2 years)*
*Operational constraints (flying in same theater, warfighter integration, spectrum, HZ Frequency, platform integration, on-ramp introduction)*
*Contested environment – failure to go forward*
*Capacity – Provide support*

*c) Describe how can you maintain accurate information throughout the system lifecycle?*

*Transmit performance data automatically/post mission assessment/contractor provided*
3a. Understand what spares you need:

a) List the information you need during Acquisition phase to plan for sustainment.
Request mission profile systems from contractor
System failure rates (e.g. reliability)
Operational availability requirements
Lead time for spares and repair parts

b) List any anticipated systemic constraints or barriers.
Don’t know what spares are needed
Did not do any deliberate R&M assessment
Are any spares available?
Forecasted demand is unknown
What is the impact of the operational environment on the system
3a. Trained Maintainers

a) List the information you need during Acquisition phase to plan for sustainment.

Training Material
Dedicated training and trainers
Contractor training and documentation
Technical data & drawings

b) List any anticipated systemic constraints or barriers.

Limited funding
Time to fully develop a training curriculum
3a. Bringing in Logistics expertise earlier

a) List the information you need during Acquisition phase to plan for sustainment.

Complete plan for supportability – LCSP
Early coordination between PM and DLA (If POR)
Earlier test (NDI) to support fully developed training and education

B) List any anticipated systemic constraints or barriers.

For Urgent acquisitions long term support may not have been planned/funded.
3a. Buy Performance

a) List the information you need during Acquisition phase to plan for sustainment.

Defined requirements
Performance Work Statement description
Expected performance

b) List any anticipated systemic constraints or barriers.

Resources - $$
Time
Sole source constraints
3a. Parallel development of capability

a) information you need to accept during Acquisition phase to plan for sustainment.

Staggered delivery
Parallel development of urgent design and planned program of record
Incentivize the contractor’s performance vice number of units delivered

b) List any anticipated systemic constraints or barriers.

Failure to deliver required capability
Funds
Schedule
Field sustainment
3a. Modify the requirement – accepted level of degradation (numbers/performance)

a) information you need to accept during Acquisition phase to plan for sustainment.

Staggered delivery
Parallel development of urgent design and planned program of record
Incentivize the contractor’s performance vice number of units delivered

b) List any anticipated systemic constraints or barriers.

Failure to deliver required capability
Funds
Schedule
Field sustainment
4. What are the differences in the way we treat repairable versus consumable items?

Urgent Acquisition programs are **INSTEAD** of the Deliberate process.

Typically Contractor Logistics support (FSRs)
5. What are the differences in the way we treat systems that are already in Sustainment phases?

Urgent Acquisition programs are **INSTEAD** of the Deliberate process

Defined Outcome

Mature COTs solution

Two Year delivery

200M in funds

Typically Contractor Logistics support (FSRs)
Combat UAS
Scenario Platform Summary

• Design a UAS that is capable of flying in the operational environment with realistic/attainable performance

• Battery life strong
  – Launch from platform
  – Perform Mission
  – Return

• Strong engine to carry 50 lbs – 200 lbs of payload

• Conduct appropriate tests to determine support requirements
  – Vanishing electronics
More Scenario Information
NDIA Supply Chain Workshop
28 February 2017

Acquisition of Urgent & Emergent Requirements

LtCol Robert Castro

Ms. Sue Kinney-Perkins
“The current acquisition system must be fundamentally changed to field new capabilities at the speed that this emerging threat environment demands. The number and diversity of processes that have been conceived to bypass this system have been truly innovative.”

Arthur H. Barber III—For War-Winning Innovation, Fix the Process.
Defining Rapid Acquisition

A **streamlined and tightly integrated iterative approach**, acting upon **validated** urgent or emergent capability requirements, to:

- conduct analysis and evaluate alternatives and identify preferred solutions

- develop and approve acquisition documents

- **contract using all available statutory and regulatory authorities and waivers and deviations of such**, appropriate to the situation

- identify and minimize technical development, integration, and manufacturing risks; and rapidly produce and deliver required capabilities
Answering the warfighters urgent needs

- **1942 – The Need: Destroy German & Japanese Pillboxes**
  - Flamethrowers – the most effective
  - War Department said ‘OK’ – but must have a range of 200yds
  - At the time 40yds was the best
  - US Army & Marine Corps took it anyway – developed tactics

- **Used at Italy / Tarawa / Saipan / Okinawa**
  - Worked good - but had vulnerabilities

- **1945 before 200yd capability was developed**

- **When was the 200 yard flamethrower deployed – Okinawa….but … TTP’s / CONOPS established**

Lessons Learned:

IN WARTIME – Get the capability to the Warfighter – let him test it

- Rapid prototyping & experimentation works
- Follow multiple, parallel lines of development
- Develop future spirals in or near the field of battle
- Cooperation with allies (if you have them) matters
- Toleration for failure - focus on solving the problem
- Operators can quickly develop tactics for new systems
- Convergence
- **Hustle**: the time frame for development is weeks or months, NOT years
Adapting in Contact
Requirements + Resourcing + Acquisition = the Urgent Needs Process (UNP)

- Since 2003:
  - More than 800 Urgent Universal Need Statements (Urgent UNSs)
  - Layered onto our existing force development organizations
  - Interim solutions, materiel and non-materiel
  - Jump starting our deliberate processes

- Across every portfolio:
  - Pelvic Protection, FROG gear, CREW
  - 3 Generations of Unmanned Systems
  - Variety of Handheld IED Detectors
  - JTAC Lightweight Target Designator
  - Route Recon & Clearance (R2C)
  - “Harvest Hawk” Armed KC-130
  - Individual and Crew-Served Optics
  - Ground-Based Operational Surveillance System (G-BOSS)
“But What Have You Done For Us Lately?”
The Urgent Needs Process

- Advanced Aircraft Survivability Equipment
  - “Large Aircraft IR Counter-Measures” on SPMAGTF MV-22s to defeat advanced MANPADS

- SPMAGTF Enroute C4
  - Hatch-Mounted Satellite Antenna System (HMSAS) on KC-130

- Counter-Low, Slow, Small UAS
  - “Drone Defender” now,
  - Advanced “Detect, Track, Defeat” next

- Fleet Antiterrorism Security Teams (FAST) Comm Suites

- MARSOC ISR
  - Nano-VTOL UAVs
  - Early deployment of VMU w/RQ-21

- Some that we’re working on:
  - Small UAVs for Ground Combat Element
  - Link-16 Datalink on AV-8B Harrier
  - HMSAS on MV-22 & Raid Force “Tablets”
  - ICM-RMS Force Preservation Tool - to help leaders monitor Marines at risk

ISO “Specific Combat or Contingency Ops”
What does it take to “Field” a capability quickly?

Know what it is that you’re trying to field
- “Requirements” may be incomplete initially or nonexistent
- Must consider the full-range of DOTmLPF-P Solutions

Know how it’s going to be used and who’s going to use it
- Supported by viable CONOPS, Force management (e.g., boots on the ground) considerations

Have mature technology in the bank; or a plan for rapid integration, rapid development; or a plan for focused/rapid technology maturation (e.g. “STATE OF THE SHELF”)
- Must be technologically feasible
- Should not require extensive research, development and testing
- Considered as Interim or Bridge solutions. Multiple simultaneous approaches

Have a responsive “acquisition” structure
- Analysis, program mgt, contracts, executing agencies, independent assessment teams, warfighter integration, supply chain and logistics

Know how much money you are going to need, and have a plan to receive/execute it if you get it
- Budgets for current execution year, future year(s), and ID color/type
- MOA/MOUs help confirm expectations if co-funded
- Reprograming & Task Force Funding

Training, logistics, and operational support
- Organic, Interim Support, Field Services Representatives (FSRs), COTS
- Transition Intent/Plan - Warfighter to Disposition Analysis or Program of Record

Have a sense of urgency and clear authorities
Review: DoD Decision Support Systems

Joint Capabilities Integration & Development System (JCIDS)

VCJCS/JROC Oversight

Capabilities-Based Continuous (Warfighter Needs Driven)

CJCS 3170.01 Series

Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) Oversight

DOD Dir 7045.14

Defense Acquisition System

Annual Budget Cycle (Calendar Driven)

Milestones (Event Driven)

DoD 5000 Series

Planning, Programming, Budgeting & Execution (PPBE) Process

DEPSECDEF Oversight

DMAG

SLRG

DoD 5000 Series

Capabilities-Based Continuous (Warfighter Needs Driven)

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DEPSECDEF Oversight

DMAG

SLRG
Deliberate vs. Urgent/Emergent ACQ

- FAR = Urgent and Compelling.
- RAA = $200M for immediate SECDEF use.
- Joint Urgent Operational Needs Fund
- Others: Supplemental, Bridge, OCO, Iraqi Freedom Fund (IFF) Reprogramming, Special “Colorless” Task Force Funds (e.g. MRAP TF, JIEDDO, ISR TF, REF)

DOT&E “rigorous enough” “Tailored Evals” Limited “Honest Broker” role

PM ensures O&S Phase Contractor Logistics Support (CLS)
DoD Policy (handout provided)

DoDD 5000.71 - “Rapid Fulfillment of Combatant Commander Urgent Operational Needs”
- DoD’s highest priority is to provide warfighters involved in conflict or preparing for imminent contingency operations with the capabilities urgently needed to overcome unforeseen threats, achieve mission success, and reduce risk of casualties.
- DoD Components will use all available authorities to fund, develop, assess, produce, deploy, operate, and sustain UON capabilities expeditiously. Fielding of an interim solution, even if it provides less than full capability, will not be delayed to enable extended development of immature technology.
- To the extent possible, actions to resolve UONs will be accomplished by using parallel, rather than sequential, processes to refine and prioritize requirements, execute rapid acquisition actions, and allocate resources on a more expedited timetable than the deliberate PPBES process.

DoDI 5000.02 – “Operation of the Defense Acquisition System”
- “URGENT OPERATIONAL NEEDS AND OTHER QUICK REACTION CAPABILITIES. DoD’s highest priority is to provide warfighters involved in conflict or preparing for imminent contingency operations with the capabilities urgently needed to overcome unforeseen threats, achieve mission success, and reduce risk of casualties, as described in DoD Directive 5000.71.
- The objective is to deliver capability quickly, within days or months. DoD Components will use all available authorities to expeditiously fund, develop, assess, produce, deploy, and sustain these capabilities for the duration of the urgent need, as determined by the requesting DoD Component. Approval authorities for each acquisition program covered by this enclosure will be delegated to a level that promotes rapid action.

“3. POLICY. It is DoD policy that:
   “a. DoD’s highest priority is to provide warfighters involved in conflict or preparing for imminent contingency operations with the capabilities urgently needed to overcome unforeseen threats, achieve mission success, and reduce risk of casualties.”- DoDD 5000.71
UNP Overview
Rapid Requirements + Resourcing + Acquisition

UNP 1.0 Urgent Need Identification & Certification
- Draft UUNS Deployed
- Draft UUNS Pre-Deployment
- Supported COMMARFOR (e.g. MARCENT)
- Certified U-UNS

UNP 2.0: Solution Development
- DC CD&I
- Solution Recommendation Brief (SRB)
- Capabilities Portfolio Integration Board (CPIB)
- MROC Decision Brief
- MROC

UNP 3.0: Solution Execution
- MCSC / PEO LS
- Urgent Statement of Need
- DC CD&I
- MROCDM

UNP 4.0: Operations & Support
- Operational use & support, Performance & cost monitoring, Sustainment planning
- Disposition Analysis
- MCFDS Consideration

UNP 5.0: Disposal (materiel)
- Disposal Planning/Resourcing/Execution
- Program of Record

1 Decision authority for Quantity Increases to MROC-approved U-UNs.

Not One Process, 800 Times.
800 Processes, One Time Each.
What We Do
Everything. As Fast As We Can

- Starts with an “Urgent Universal Need Statement”
  - Materiel (mostly) – Pistols, PUMAs, and Persistent ISR
    - New procurement
    - Redistribution of existing inventory
  - Flight Clearances – Different bombs on the BRU-55 “Smart Rack”
  - New organizations – “Stability Ops Info Cell”
  - Unplanned Deployments – VMU w/RQ-21 ISO MARSOC

- CMC Testimony: “How long does it take? It depends.”
  - Target – 60 days from MARFOR “Certification” to DC CD&I “Validation”
  - Constraint – 24 months from MROC decision to delivery

- Service-Common capabilities only
  - RQ-12 Wasp IV? Yes (after Congressional scrutiny.)
  - Unique Sniper Rifle? No.

- Everything’s a trade-off
  - No “Pot” of available funding
  - Each U-UNS funded at cost to Congressionally-approved Program of Record

- IF it’s an Urgent Need
Recap: Deliberate Requirements vs. Urgent/Emergent Requirements

Deliberate Requirements
- ICD, CDD, CPD, etc
- Future Focused, ACAT Programs
- Very Structured Process
- Evolved Requirements (KPPs, KSAs)
- Capabilities Based Assessments
- Analysis of Alternatives
- Deliberate Development, Program of Record
- High Visibility on Program, Lots of Feedback
- Large Investment

Urgent/Emergent Requirements
- Loss of life, Immediate Requirement
- Critical mission failure
- Contingency operations
- Now-focused, ACAT II or below
- Streamlined process, Limited Investment
- Quick assessment of alternatives
- Limited development if feasible
- High visibility on results
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Requirements</strong></th>
<th><strong>JLTV</strong></th>
<th><strong>MRAP</strong></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Army &amp; USMC originate ICD/CDC Vetted by Army, USMC, JCIDS Worldwide Use (dry-wet, hot-cold) Priority is Cost &amp; Performance Key Reqs: Survivability, Mobility, Air &amp; Sea Transportability, Payload</td>
<td>USMC Iraq Cdr Originates JUONS Vetted by COCOM, USMC &amp; JROC Use in Iraq (Dry, Hot, Sandy) Priority was Schedule &amp; Survivability &quot;Stop the bleeding&quot; Key Req - Personnel Survivability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Funding</strong></td>
<td>PPBE</td>
<td>Base, Supplemental, Bridge, OCO “Colorless” MRAP Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Acquisition</strong></td>
<td>FAR, DOD 5000, ACAT 1D Full Scale Development - all Milestones Competitive Prototyping, buy TDP Cost - Performance driven Acq Strat</td>
<td>FAR, DOD 5000, ACAT 1D COTS - Award Production Contract Limited &quot;Try before you buy&quot; Some candidates rejected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Technology</strong></td>
<td>Substantial Technology Development and Integration</td>
<td>Off-The-Shelf (South African Technology)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Product</strong></td>
<td>Single Make &amp; Model Configuration Control Helo Lift Weight compatible w/Prepo Afloat Req</td>
<td>Many Makes &amp; Models Minimal Configuration Control Met &quot;survivability&quot; requirement Limited Mobility Limited air &amp; sea transportability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Life Cycle Support</strong></td>
<td>Organic maintenance Stringent reliability &amp; maintainability reqs Designed for supportability Fuel efficiency reqs Full-Up Logistics (parts, depot, training)</td>
<td>Contractor Logistics Support OEM Field Representatives OEM Supply Support High O&amp;M costs Logistics funded by MRAP Fund MRAP University (MRAP Fund)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Honest Broker</strong></td>
<td>Full-Up T&amp;E Program DDT&amp;E Oversight of DT&amp;E DOT&amp;E Oversight of OT&amp;E</td>
<td>Abbreviated testing before fielding DT&amp;E and OT&amp;E conducted post-fielding</td>
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Inherent Risks & Trade-offs

- **Solution Failure** – *rapid fielding may result in a solution that does not perform as planned*

- **Short-term success may not meet longer-term needs**

- **Inadequate sustainment planning:**
  - *May result in requirements for multiple upgrades or for more costly improvements*
  - *Issues if we must transition to a new sustainer other than the initial provider--short learning curve*

- **Transition to Program of Record (PoR)** — *requires backward development of required DoD 5000.02 and JCIDS documentation*
End of the O&S Phase of (Rapid) Acquisition

No later than 1 year after the program enters O&S (or earlier if directed by the DoD Component), the DoD Component will appoint an official to conduct a Disposition Analysis.

### Assessment Recommendation?

- **Inadequate capability solution — Need an alternative.**
  - Use existing validation of urgent/emergent capability requirement to rapidly acquire a different capability solution.
  - Retire rapidly acquired capability solution at end of timeline validated for urgent/emergent capability requirement.

- **Limited duration capability requirement. (Non-enduring)**
  - Revalidate extended (but finite) timeframe for urgent/emergent capability requirement to support sustainment of rapidly acquired capability solution.

- **Enduring capability requirement.**
  - Modify other previously validated enduring capability requirements to address transitioning urgent/emergent capability requirements into existing POR(s).
  - Validate a new CDD (for further development) or CPD (for production/sustainment) to support transition to a POR. May be a new start POR or use the rapidly acquired capability solution.

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**Figure B-8. End of the O&S Phase of Rapid Acquisition; JCIDS Manual, pg B-33**

### Three Potential Outcomes:

1. **Failure / Limited Success (Termination)**
2. **Success / Limited Duration Requirement (Sustain for Contingency)**
3. **Success / Enduring Requirement (Transition to POR)**
BACK-UP
Apply SCRM process principles (identify, assess, mitigate, and manage) to answer the question: How can the DoD & Industry better plan for sustainment during Acquisition phase?

1. What are the sustainment risks/issues associated with your scenario? (List in priority of severity)

2. What proactive sustainment activities would help mitigate risks or resolve issues?

3. For each proactive sustainment activity:
   a) List the information you need during Acquisition phase to plan for sustainment.
   b) List any anticipated systemic constraints or barriers.
   c) Describe how can you can maintain accurate information throughout the system lifecycle?

4. What are the differences in the way we treat repairable versus consumable items?

5. What are the differences in the way we treat systems that are already in Sustainment phases?
Appendix 1: October 2015 Workshop Findings

• Sound decisions are impeded by lack of supply chain visibility;
• Total supply chain mapping early in process could facilitate better decisions;
• Supply chain ownership changes throughout process and is not clearly defined, nor is the decision authority;
• Technical data package ownership should be addressed in program’s initial acquisition plan but may not need to be purchased in the initial phase;
• Flexibility is constrained by available suppliers with proper credentials, but supplier qualification is beneficial even if it results in reducing the supplier pool;
• Malicious actions against the supply chain need to be considered as part of acquisition plan;
• Partnerships reduce risk and cost but must be carefully constructed early in process; and,
• Effective decisions should be made on a cost-benefit outcome, and should be added to our next workshop.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Deliberate</th>
<th>Urgent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Requirements</strong></td>
<td>Service/Agency Originates&lt;br&gt;Focus on &quot;Roles &amp; Missions&quot;&lt;br&gt;Vetted by Service &amp; JCIDS&lt;br&gt;Generic Capability (sometimes vague)&lt;br&gt;Worldwide Use&lt;br&gt;Spectrum of Missions (OMS/MP)&lt;br&gt;Oper Effectiveness &amp; Suitability Reqs&lt;br&gt;Manning constraints&lt;br&gt;Detailed Analysis of Alternatives</td>
<td>Commander originates&lt;br&gt;Focus on Named Operation&lt;br&gt;Vetted by COCOM/J-8/Service&lt;br&gt;Solution to known threat or need&lt;br&gt;Specific geographic area &amp; climate&lt;br&gt;Specific operational application&lt;br&gt;Minimum Essential Reqs&lt;br&gt;Abbreviated Analysis of Alternatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Funding</strong></td>
<td>PPBE (RDT&amp;E, Procurement, O&amp;M)</td>
<td>Next Supplemental, Bridge, OCO Reprogramming&lt;br&gt;Rapid Acquisition Authority&lt;br&gt;&quot;Colorless&quot; Earmarked Funds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Acquisition</strong></td>
<td>FAR, DOD 5000&lt;br&gt;Phases &amp; Milestones&lt;br&gt;Acq Strategy driven by C-S-P &amp; Policy</td>
<td>FAR, DOD 5000, RAA&lt;br&gt;&quot;Try before you buy&quot; Fixed Price&lt;br&gt;Schedule Driven Acq Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Technology</strong></td>
<td>Range of Development Efforts&lt;br&gt;Full Scale Development to OTS</td>
<td>Mostly Off-The-Shelf&lt;br&gt;Some Technology Integration&lt;br&gt;Small Scale Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Product</strong></td>
<td>Single Make &amp; Model&lt;br&gt;Configuration Control</td>
<td>Potentially Many Makes &amp; Models&lt;br&gt;Less Configuration Control (if any)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Life Cycle Support</strong></td>
<td>Organic maintenance&lt;br&gt;TM, Spares, TMDE&lt;br&gt;Depot &amp; DLA support&lt;br&gt;Training System</td>
<td>Often ad hoc support&lt;br&gt;Contractor Logistics Support&lt;br&gt;OEM Field Representatives&lt;br&gt;OEM Supply Support</td>
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<td><strong>Honest Broker</strong></td>
<td>DOT&amp;E Oversight of OT&amp;E</td>
<td>Abbreviated OT&amp;E&lt;br&gt;No DOT&amp;E Oversight&lt;br&gt;In-Theater Evaluation</td>
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</table>
“When wars end, leaders are often eager to move on to the next challenge. This is why it is crucial to make permanent the institutional innovations resulting from the hard-earned lessons of Afghanistan and Iraq, while the experiences are still fresh. Too many lives were lost in the early years of those wars because the Pentagon failed to keep up with a changing battlefield. Never again should it make the same mistake.”

Ashton B Carter in Foreign Affairs, January 2014

- All DoD needs cannot be met by the same acquisition processes.
- Rapid is countercultural and will be under supported in traditional organizations
- RA must be based on proven technology and robust manufacturing processes
- Institutional barriers – people, funding, and processes – are powerful inhibitors to successful RA
- Program offices fielded solutions faster than (reimbursable) research labs & engineering centers.
- The tendency for Congress to mandate acquisition reforms under the auspice of DoD not taking action

- DoD is unable to fully assess performance of the processes
- Inadequate training for originators of urgent/emergent requirements
- Funding challenges were the primary cause of delays
- OSD has played a reactive rather than proactive role in exercising RAA
- 31+ entities manage urgent needs and expedite solutions; Overlap exists as there are numerous points of entry
- Rapid acquisitions require an immediate flexibly-tasked source of funding
15 Years of Lessons Learned

- Good communications with user facilitated a clearer understanding of requirements and plans for fielding initiatives resulting in a positive affect on CSP
- High-Level champions are critical to the success of RA
- “Faster” can mean leveraging existing requirements, contracts, and documentation from other programs
- Transition planning and staffing consistency during the transition is essential
- Ongoing user feedback enables iterative capability enhancement

- RA Orgs employed various contracting practices to overcome challenges having negative impact on CSP
- Initiatives leveraged three types of solutions: (1) off-the-shelf products, (2) modifications of off-the-shelf items to add capabilities, and (3) products requiring technology development.
- Wartime environments motivate bureaucratic flexibility
- Users will tolerate operational risk and less than 100% of desired performance
Urgent/Emergent Needs Staffing

Urgent/Emergent (JUONs/JEONs)

Functional Capability Board
- JRAC Participation
- SME inputs from DoD
- Prioritization within this portfolio
- CCMD Inputs
- Non-materiel recommendations

For JEONs
Verify validation body
With VCJCS (JCB/JROC)

Acquisition
(JRAC)

Recommend
Different process
Validation
Rejection

Sponsor
(CCMD)

Termination

1 day

14 days (JUONs)
30 Days (JEONs)

Total: 15-31 days
Challenges

- Motivating rapid acquisition in the absence of war
- Establishing responsive funding streams
- Overcoming pushback from traditional stakeholders (IA, Testing, Sustainment)
- Establish ways to expedite testing, prototyping and experimentation to support rapid acquisition
- Prioritizing trade-offs in meeting requirements based on user feedback mechanisms
- Reduce unwanted redundancy and overlap in rapid acquisition organizational roles, responsibilities and process, without creating additional procurement risk.
- Creating better visibility over the full range of DoD’s Urgent/Emergent needs
- Establishing Mechanisms to protect PMs and other key stakeholders to
  - Embrace increased risk
  - Tailor acquisition strategies

Issues & Challenges on Future Rapid Acquisition Reforms

Challenges

- Capitalize on existing programs to enable rapid acquisition documentation, staff actions and contracting
- “Top-Level” advocacy exists to streamline process and promote bureaucratic flexibility, especially during a wartime footing...What about during peace time or during times of fiscal austerity.
- Capitalizing on the Lessons Learned in rapid acquisitions over the last 15 years of war and capturing the advantages from “ad-hoc organizational tailoring.”
- Leverage advanced and mature technologies within DoD, industry, and with our international partners
- Strengthening useful transition processes like the Army CDRT
UNP FLOW within CD&I

1. **Receive U-UNS and Assign Action Officer**
   - CD&I CurOps
   - Initial UNP

2. **Determine Requirement & Timeline**
   - CD&I ID
   - Assign ID & CIO
   - Assign Analyst
   - Material solution determination/ Cost & schedule data

3. **Estimate Cost & Schedule**
   - MTAG
   - Determine Options to fill the gap

4. **Verify Appropriation Type & Fiscal Year**
   - What is Needed?
   - When is it Needed?
   - Trade-Off Decision.
   - MCSC RTT
   - Assign PM & AO

5. **Determine Source(s) & Justification**
   - Source of Funding?
   - Acquisition Strategy?
   - Cost vs. Sked Options.
   - MCSC Program Office
   - Assign Analyst

6. **Prepare SRB for Staffing**
   - MCSC DFM
   - MCSC Fund Source
   - Fund Source Data: FY, BLI, BA, PE, & (5) Questions

7. **Finalize SRB**
   - HQ P&R
   - Non MCSC Fund Source or ATR
   - Fund Source
   - Approve Funding

8. **Staff & Endorse**
   - 45 days
   - 10 days
   - 15 days

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**Questions**
- CDIB
- DIR CDD
- DC CD&I
Urgent Needs Process
CD&I Internal

Supported COMMARFOR

Urgent UNS to CurOps

Integration Division assigned

Action Officer Dev

Draft SRB

CurOps IDs Funding Sources

SRB Complete

SRB Sufficient

SRB Complete

SRB Sufficient

CPIB Review & Vote

DirCDD Review

DC CD&I Review

Concur w/Rec

Concur w/Rec

Concur w/Rec

CurOps Dev UUNS MROC DB

MROC Decision Memorandum

MROC

Process facilitated by VNS

Goal is 60 Days or Less at CD&I

MCSC/PEO/NAVAIR/ etc Procure, Deliver & Sustain

CDD Urgent Statement of Need (USON)

30 D

30 D

2 D

10 D

15 D

7 D

7 D

7 D

7 D

3 D

30 D

7 D

7 D

7 D

3 D
**Urgent Universal Need Statement (Urgent UNS) Initiates the UNP**

- **Definition.** An exceptional request from a combatant command-level Marine component commander for an additional warfighting capability critically needed by operating forces conducting combat or contingency operations. Failure to deliver the capability requested by the U-UNS is likely to result in the inability of units to accomplish their missions or risks increased probability of casualties and loss of life.

- **Urgent Needs Process Entrance Criteria:**
  - **Combat or contingency deployment**
  - **Mission failure or Increased casualties**

- **References:**
  - MCO 3900.17, “The Marine Corps Urgent Needs Process (UNP) and the Urgent Universal Needs Statement (UUNS),” 17 Oct 08
  - SECNAVINST 5000.2E Ch 1.8.1 “DON Urgent Needs Process (UNP)” 1 Sep 11
  - DODD 5000.71 “Rapid Fulfillment of Combatant Commander Urgent Operational Needs” 24 Aug 12
  - DODI 5000.02 “Operation of the Defense Acquisition System” 7 Jan 15

“3. POLICY. It is DoD policy that:
   “a. DoD’s highest priority is to provide warfighters involved in conflict or preparing for imminent contingency operations with the capabilities urgently needed to overcome unforeseen threats, achieve mission success, and reduce risk of casualties.”

- DoDD 5000.71
DoN Policy

• SECNAVINST 5000.2e “IMPLEMENTATION ...DEFENSE ACQUISITION SYSTEM AND JCIDS”
  – DON Urgent Needs Process (UNP)
  – An urgent need is an exceptional request from a Navy or Marine Corps component commander for an additional warfighting capability critically needed by operating forces conducting combat or contingency operations. Failure to deliver the capability requested is likely to result in the inability of units to accomplish their missions or increases the probability of casualties and loss of life.
  – The UNP streamlines the abbreviated requirements, resources, and acquisition processes to address mission-critical warfighting capability gaps more rapidly than the normal processes permit. Subject to statutes and regulations, this process is optimized for speed, and accepts risk with regard to DOTMLPF, integration, sustainment, and other considerations.
  – Processing and responding to urgent needs takes precedence over normal capability development.
  – To reduce overall solution execution cycle time, concurrent execution of incremental interim and longer term solutions is strongly encouraged. To the maximum extent possible, streamlined acquisition, certification and testing processes will be used to expedite the delivery of solutions.
Distinct Deliberate & Urgent Processes

Different Problems Need Different Tools at Different Times

Deliberate: Good & Cheap

Requirement (JCIDS)

Resourcing (PPBES)

Acquisition (DOD 5000)

Programmed Solutions

Interim Solutions

U-UNS

Integration Division

Time

Urgent: Fast

Requirements + Resourcing + Acquisition = Solution

Marine Corps Enterprise Integration Plan

Requirement (JCIDS)

Resourcing (PPBES)

Acquisition (DOD 5000)

Interim Solutions

UNP MCFDS
Bottom-Up Top-Down
Proven Needs Projected Needs
In Parallel In Series
Schedule Cost & Performance
Accepts Risk Avoids Risk
OCO Possible Baseline Primarily
Interim Solutions Enduring Solutions

Requirement

Resourcing

Acquisition

Requirement (JCIDS)