

DoD Draft Software Acquisition Pathway Policy and Guidance

**NDIA SE Division
Industry Review Feedback
August 8, 2019**

DoD Software Acquisition Pathway (Draft)



- OUSD (A&S) is seeking industry feedback on draft (1) Software Acquisition Pathway Policy and (2) Business Decision Guidance. (aka “Software 5000.02”)
- Cross-divisional NDIA review kickoff held at NDIA HQ (7/11/19)
 - Systems Engineering; ADAPT; Integrated Program Management; Cyber
- Industry comments widely solicited (various means) thru 8/2/19







Figure 1- Software Pathway

Broad solicitation for industry inputs

(written comments, informal comments, verbal discussion/feedback)

- **NDIA**

- Systems Engineering Division
 - Committees
 - Industry steering committee (company reps)
- ADAPT
- Cyber Division
- Integrated Program Management Division


- **Company-internal**

- Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon, L3Harris, ...
- Cross-functional (Engineering, Software, Agile/DevOps SMEs)

- **INCOSE WGs (IS2019)**

- Agile and SE WG; SSE WG; Measurement WG

- **Inputs from individuals**



Substantial consensus across industry organizations and stakeholder groups led to a consolidated response to A&S review request

Summary Level Industry Feedback

Generally very favorable industry feedback on A&S SW policy and guidance. Support DoD intent and direction.
A few areas of concern: SE; Security; Metrics.

General

- Positive overall concepts, approach, direction
- Like Minimally Viable Capability Release (MVCR) concept
- ...but some terms differing from common industry usage (e.g., MVP) can be confusing for adoption)

Key Inputs

- Very strong industry consensus that integration with Systems Engineering must be included
- Scope should also apply to custom SW on custom HW /embedded to the extent practical (leverage benefits broadly; few programs are pure SW/COTS)
- Strengthen Security integration with Engineering across all aspects of life cycle (DevSecOps) – concept, roadmap, architecture, design, development, test, delivery, ...
- Security objective is much broader than continuous ATO
 - ▶ secure, resilient cyber systems – must be designed in
- Over-achieved significantly on SW metrics – well beyond prior input recommendations (DSB, DIB SWAP, PSM, NDIA, ...) and industry practice. Lack linkage to information needs, actions.

Substantial consensus on these inputs across industry (companies, stakeholder groups)
Many details provided in consolidated commenting spreadsheet and other attachments.

Summary of written inputs in commenting spreadsheet

(NDIA SE Division - as of 8/2/19)

Category	L	M	H	VH	Grand Total
Editorial	1	5			6
General	7	9	4		20
Technical		16	27	14	57
Grand Total	8	30	31	14	83



Comment Provided By(Individual or Org)		(All)					
Count of Impact			Impact				
Product (Selection)	Category	L	M	H	VH	Grand Total	
Policy (Software Acquisition Pathway Policy)	General	1	4	4		9	
	Technical		11	16	8	35	
Policy (Software Acquisition Pathway Policy) Total		1	15	20	8	44	
Guidance (Business Decision Guidance)	Editorial	1	5			6	
	General	6	5			11	
	Technical		5	11	6	22	
Guidance (Business Decision Guidance) Total		7	15	11	6	39	
Grand Total		8	30	31	14	83	

Summary of written spreadsheet inputs only.
Does not include comments received from other sources (verbal, informal).

Comment Provided By(Ind)		(All)					
Count of Impact			Impact				
Product (Selection)	Keyword	L	M	H	VH	Grand Total	
Policy (Software Acquisition Pathway Policy)	Acquisition		1	1		2	
	Architecture		1			1	
	Clarity		1		1	2	
	Environment		1			1	
	Estimation		1			1	
	General	1			1	2	
	Metrics		1			1	
	Safety				1	1	
	Scope		1	1		2	
	SE				2	2	
	Security		4	16	3	23	
	Supply Chain		1			1	
	Terminology			1		1	
	Test		1	1		2	
	Transition		1			1	
	Users		1			1	
Policy (Software Acquisition Pathway Policy)		1	15	20	8	44	
Guidance (Business Decision Guidance)	Acquisition				2	2	
	Clarity		2	2	2	6	
	Definitions	2	3		1	6	
	Editorial	4	6			10	
	Metrics			1	1	2	
	Scope			1		1	
	Security	1	4	7		12	
Guidance (Business Decision Guidance) Total		7	15	11	6	39	
Grand Total		8	30	31	14	83	

Keywords assigned by NDIA for affinity grouping of topic areas

Extensive participation, discussion, and feedback from System Security Engineering (SSE) Committee (thank you, Holly and Cory!)



Key Take-aways:

- Security is framed in a way of compliance; to reach Approval to Operate is not to reach a secure system.
- The focus on DevSecOps will contribute significantly to the concept of continuous ATO, but the document omits the need for Application level cybersecurity.
- As many of our products are systems of systems, a holistic appreciation of all security specializations (Cyber, IA, AT, SSE, SwA, SCRM) is necessary; Compliance to RMF Controls only buys a minimum level of assurance and doesn't adequately cover the security specialties in an integrated risk managed trade space.
- Importance of MVCR security requires elevation, fielding a 'minimum' introduces environmental, intended use, and configuration control concerns. A greater definition of a sustainment support community is necessary.
- The push to 'leverage enterprise services' and the level of interaction with the test strategy seems to ignore embedded systems.
- With the shift from monolithic requirements to more agile methodology, cost estimation will be a problem. The top recommendation cited to improve cost estimates is to "define the team size and makeup", which is great for defining how much will be spent but a poor way to determine how much the work should cost. This also assumes a dedicated workforce with the right skills are available. This may work for top priority programs but will be challenging to scale to all programs with the gap in talent.
- While the idea of user testing of an MVP allows for flexibility in terms of capability and design, security is best designed into the architecture from the onset, major revisions may lead to vulnerabilities.
- The flexibility of CNS/UA/MVP is an exciting prospect, but firm high-level requirements are necessary to drive core architecture.
- The document fails to capture the need for systems-level thinking and the involvement of systems engineers and architects.
- Lessons learned include the short story incremental development and review cycles are good but the traditional major reviews are still needed to ensure the big picture isn't lost while focusing on detailed iterative developments.

- **Many additional detailed security-related comments provided in attached notes and commenting spreadsheet**



Microsoft Word Document

- **Integrate written inputs from ADAPT and other NDIA divisions**
- **Review industry inputs with NDIA SE Division for consensus**
- **Submit inputs to OUSD A&S**
- **Request a collaborative meeting with OUSD A&S to discuss industry input**
 - Follow-up from NDIA HQ kickoff and OUSD A&S request