

Remedial Construction
and
Non-Stockpile

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Discussion Topics

- Afghanistan surge –
 - What is the impact on funding to the JPEO CBD programs?
 - If funding has been appropriated but not released to the JPEO, what mitigation actions would be considered to avoid an ADA and still keep the program moving forward?
- In-sourcing –
 - Is in-sourcing producing the desired results?
 - What are the lessons learned from the in-sourcing process?
- Multiple award contracts –
 - Is government getting the expected competition at the task level and is the government getting better value
- Acquisition Center Staffing –
 - There appears to be a delay in processing task orders due to fewer people and increased workload; what is the prognosis for the next year?

Year into Weapons Systems Reform Act of 2009

- Organizational Conflict of Interest Comments
 - With limited sources for prime weapons systems weapons systems new rules almost ensures that there will be conflicts of interest
 - Prohibiting any “contract or affiliate of the contractor from having a direct financial interest in the development or construction of the weapon system or any component thereof” (these systems engineering and technical assistance are known as SETA functions) – the prohibition further limits the competition for major weapon systems if the large military – industrial companies are unable to provide technical assistance, or if they do provide that assistance wherein they have superior knowledge and expertise, they are then prohibited from providing the systems or any subcomponent of the system – again the very organization best able to manufacture.
 - In large companies, “fire-walling” off the programs is commonplace, but demands a level of trust that the Government has not been prepared to accept – trust with verification – is not routinely practiced and thus the decision appears periodically through the years to simply eliminate the need by prohibiting companies from providing both services. This is not new, we have seen this pendulum swing over the past 20 years – from one of tolerance for a strong OCI mitigation planning process to the absolute prohibition – the focus on the OCI mitigation process would yield more positive and cost effective results.

Year into Weapons Systems Reform Act of 2009

- Measures to Maximize Competition Comments
 - Competitive prototyping - in theory appears good however; it appears that paying duplicative costs for 2 systems is not yielding a better design or a valid second source
 - Dual sourcing - is useful but seems to be expensive and administratively time consuming; requires a committed program office and staff at both contractors and Government organizations – and can quickly deteriorate into “shown me another rock” rather than the viable “dual source” identification;
 - Funding second source for next generation prototype – if first generation does not have adequate tests and evaluation, going to a second source will be expensive and time-consuming changes to the “second source” while “first source” is still in shakedown status.
 - These and several of the other measures have been implemented over the years with varying degrees of success. It appears that rather than solve the problem, the old adage of “go back to ground zero” and start again has been the way of the military – more efforts directed at making one of the theories work, before scrapping the idea is likely to yield better results.