

SO/LIC SPECIAL OPERATIONS/ LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT DIVISION NEWS




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MESSAGE FROM THE DIVISION CHAIRMAN

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COL Jeff Ellis, USA (Ret)
Chairman, SO/LIC Division



Greetings to all present and past SOF Members, your families and supporters of the SOF Community: 2009 has come and gone and that means it is time for the annual SO/LIC Symposium. I hope that everyone takes the opportunity to attend this symposium as it has all the earmarks of being the best one yet.

With the coordination of USSOCOM, we have adopted the theme, *"The Evolving National Strategy: Its Impact on Special Operations and Its Partners."* We have a great list of senior government officials, both from the new administration, military commands, Congressional staffers and Think Tanks, to participate as speakers. The Keynote Address will be given by ADM Eric T. Olson, USN, Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command and we will have a host of well-known, involved and knowledgeable senior officials making presentations that you will not want to miss. We believe that the symposium being held a year after a change in administration, a change in leadership in Afghanistan and the change and evolution in the world economically will provide an opportunity to look ahead at where we need to go both within USSOCOM, other key military commands, our international partners, the USG interagency and industry to meet current and evolving challenges.

Plan to join us at the Marriott Wardman Park for the **21st Annual SO/LIC Symposium and Exhibition**, February 9-11, 2010. Please visit our event website for complete agenda and registration details: <http://www.ndia.org/meetings/0880>.

Panels include:

- Reports from the Field - Regional Perspectives from the Geographic Combatant Commands
- Global Requirements
- The View of the Functional Combatant Commands
- International Perspectives
- Interagency Perspectives
- USSOCOM Service Component Command Perspectives
- Analyzing the Strategy and Making It Work

During our Annual Awards Banquet, we will award the R. Lynn Rylander Award to GEN Bryan D. (Doug) Brown, USA (Ret), past Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command. Our Guest Speaker will be Gen James N. Mattis, USMC, Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command.

Additional Keynote Speakers include:

- **Ambassador Daniel Benjamin**, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State
- **Congressman Jeff Miller (R-FL-01)**, Member, House Armed Services Committee, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee on Veterans' Affairs
- **Congressman Adam Smith (D-WA-09)**, House Armed Services Committee's Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities
- **Honorable Michael Vickers**, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations, Low Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities

Additional Speakers include: **CAPT Philip "Gardner" Howe, USN**, Director, Legislative Affairs, U.S. Special Operations Command, SOLA; **BrigGen Richard Lake, USMC**, Deputy Director of NCS for Community HUMINT, CIA; **Dr. Maren Leed**, Senior Fellow, International Security Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies; **COL Kevin McDonnell, USA**, Director, U.S. Special Operations Command, WO; **LTG John F. Mulholland, Jr., USA**, Commander, U.S. Army Special Operations Command; **Mr. James Q. Roberts**, Principle Director, Special Operations and Combating Terrorism OASD (SO/LIC&IC); and many more!

We are also pleased to announce that NDIA is now producing the SOFIC Conference in Tampa, June 15-17, 2010. We plan to link what comes out of our symposium with that effort in order to provide the most value to the command, SO/LIC community and its industry partners. I encourage you to share your ideas and look forward to you joining us for our upcoming events. Wishing you all the very best.

Sincerely,

Jeff Ellis
Chairman, SO/LIC Division

THE BEST MILITARY BOOKS OF THE DECADE

By J. Ford Huffman

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The mission: Select the best military nonfiction of the decade. First, assess the situation. Stand at the bookcase and pull the books that stand out. Then enlist help.

So what books qualify as “best”? Ones that excel in writing and reporting, that invite re-reading, that evoke emotion and offer enlightenment.

In alphabetical order by the author’s last name, here are the best of the decade:

- “Shane Comes Home” by Rinker Buck, 2005. Buck reports on the days leading to the funeral of the first Marine casualty in Iraq, 2nd Lt Shane Childers, a “Brad Pitt in uniform” whose integrity and energy were admired by everyone, including the casualty assistance officer. In the end, you admire Childers, and the officer, too.
- “Joker One: A Marine Platoon’s Story of Courage, Leadership and Brotherhood” by Donovan Campbell, 2009. This is “sweat-soaked, blood-soaked reality,” written by a Princeton and Harvard graduate and Afghanistan veteran who talks about managing warriors and himself. The story is a first-rate study of management and manhood. Campbell’s platoon taught him that “love was expressed in the only currency that mattered in combat: Action.”
- “The Fourth Star: Four Generals and the Epic Struggle for the Future of the United States Army” by David Cloud and Greg Jaffe, 2009. Two reporters present four personalities who have been off and on front pages since 2003: Army Gens. John Abizaid, George Casey, Peter Chiarelli and David Petraeus. The four have crossed paths — and one another — in the 40 years between Khe Sanh and Kabul. The four-character study has enough political and inside intrigue to humanize the brass.
- “The Last True Story I’ll Ever Tell: An Accidental Soldier’s Account of the War in Iraq” by John Crawford, 2005. The writing is understated but powerful, some of the best to come out of Iraq. Crawford was in the Army’s 101st Airborne division, then joined the National Guard. He was called to active duty during his honeymoon. “The world hears war stories told by reporters and retired generals who keep extensive notebooks and journals. They carry pens as they walk, whereas I carried a machine gun.” The gun is hot.
- “One Bullet Away: The Making of a Marine Officer” by Nathaniel Fick, 2005. A Dartmouth graduate learns how to lead troops in Afghanistan and Iraq and how to understand his strengths and limitations. (“Generation Kill” is about Fick’s unit.) Because of “Fick’s descriptive and exacting writing,” USA Today put the book on a list of the “most promising memoirs.”
- “The Forever War” by Dexter Filkins, 2008. This award-winning collection of reports and impressions takes you into harm’s way with a journalist’s eye for details and a dramatist’s ear for dialogue. In Iran, Filkins finds Warhols and Picassos. In Iraq, he finds two conversations: “The one the Iraqis were having with the Americans and the one they were having among themselves.”
- “The Good Soldiers” by David Finkel, 2009. A Washington Post writer goes inside the 2007 surge with an infantry unit out of Fort Riley, Kan., under the command of Lt Col Ralph Kauzlarich, who saw deployment as an opportunity to be a part of President George W. Bush’s effort to make a difference in Iraq. Finkel’s description of the Army’s burn center in San Antonio is as devastating as any combat scene.
- “Unfriendly Fire: How the Gay Ban Undermines the Military and Weakens America” by Nathaniel Frank, 2009. “Unfriendly Fire” separates opinion from fact, and a reader could suggest Congress and the Pentagon accept this engaging study as definitive. Why? Frank asks and tells, and service members and statistics lend credibility.
- “The War I Always Wanted: The Illusion of Glory and the Reality of War” by Brandon Friedman, 2007. The story of a college “hawkish war junkie” who goes from Manhattan to Bagram to Hillah and discovers that being an Army officer is “not as easy as it looks on TV.” And after service in two battle zones, disenchantment displaces his desire. He writes he “wanted to believe in my work,” but “instead, I was watching as politicians with no military experience hijacked the Army.”

- “Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq” by Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, 2006. The Marine Corps War College calls it “the definitive history.” This 600-page document by a retired Marine lieutenant general offers indictments and cites intelligence as well as any lack of it. Five days before the assault, Army Gen Tommy Franks summoned his team to his Qatar command center. Showing on the big screen? Actor Russell Crowe, ordering men to “unleash hell” in the opening scene of “Gladiator.” “Franks was trying to infuse his commanders with a warrior spirit.”
- “Just Another Soldier: A Year on the Ground in Iraq” by Jason Christopher Hartley, 2005. War with wit. “It’s no wonder so many homeless people are vets; they’ve all been trained to be professional bums. ...we lived in conditions that were part central booking, part homeless shelter with a twist of male brothel.” And this: “The average grunt is fairly in touch with his primary self and therefore wants generally only two things: To [have sex] and to fight, in that order.” Hoo-ah.
- “The Unforgiving Minute: A Soldier’s Education” by Craig M. Mullaney, 2009. Mullaney offers his lessons from blue-collar Rhode Island to West Point, Ranger School, Oxford University (as a Rhodes Scholar) and Afghanistan. The eternal student quotes everyone from Krishna to Clausewitz. You’ll laugh and you’ll cry at the clear-eyed, open-minded, warm-hearted candor. There’s a love story, too. And a reading list.
- “The Long Road Home: A Story of War and Family” by Martha Raddatz, 2007. Others have compared the homefront with the battlefield. But Raddatz’s book about the 1st Cavalry Division’s operations in Sadr City in April 2004 is nonfiction that reads like a novel. After eight soldiers died and 70 were wounded in 48 hours, Gen Peter Chiarelli “was horrified by what he saw.” “Sir,” a Sergeant asked the General, “why didn’t we bring our tanks?”
- “Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq” by Thomas E. Ricks, 2006. “Cobra II” tells you what went wrong in the invasion of Iraq, and “Fiasco” picks up from there with descriptions of blunders and blowhards. One officer who was privy to discussions with Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld told Ricks: “We didn’t get it right, and 1,500 troopers” — the number of U.S. dead in Iraq at the time — “have paid a price for that.”
- “Jarhead: A Marine’s Chronicle of the Gulf War and Other Battles” by Anthony Swofford, 2003. The subtitle says the book is one Marine’s story — not all Marines’ stories. Despite the disclaimer, Swofford’s take on war has its detractors. Nevertheless, the book is sometimes funny but usually an intense look at life and death in Operation Desert Storm, “neither true nor false but what I know.” Read Swofford’s words for the language. Then watch the 2005 movie.
- “Generation Kill: Devil Dogs, Iceman, Captain America and the New Face of American War” by Evan Wright, 2004. The adventure started in Rolling Stone magazine and introduced Marines including a lieutenant named Nathaniel Fick. Wright is embedded with a few (23) good men who face mud and dust, mortar and death, false starts and “bad comm” — and Wright’s reporting. One of the first books out of Iraq unwittingly set a standard for subsequent ones.

J. Ford Huffman is Military Times book reviewer.

A NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 2009? A SHORT RECOMMENDATION FOR A POSSIBLE REVISION OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947 By COL David S. Maxwell , USA

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“The Interagency is broken” is a refrain heard daily inside the beltway and in conflict areas around the world. It is also quite popular to make the call for a Goldwater-Nichols type legislation to do for the Interagency what that legislation did for the U.S. Military and Joint operations, assignments, and professional military education. Assuming that the Interagency needs to be repaired, the issue is how to reform the organizations, processes, and education and training in the Interagency so that the United States can achieve a “whole of government” approach to National Security challenges of the future and prevent situations such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan. If someone were to give guidance to those whom would craft the legislation perhaps it would look like this:

1. Ensure that every cabinet agency in the Executive Branch has as a core mission protection of U.S. National Security. Today, only the Department of Defense, along with the Intelligence Community, is viewed as the department with U.S. National Security as a core mission. There are some in the Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development who believe their activities contribute to U.S. National Security but this is not codified as a core mission. With all cabinet level departments having National Security as a core mission, they will have the justification to request the resources (funding and personnel) so that they can organize, train, educate, and provide the personnel with the requisite functional expertise from their department to support U.S. National Security missions around the world, thus achieving a “whole of government” synergy that required for success.¹

2. Establish a Joint Common Planning process applicable to all Departments to ensure synchronization and orchestration of plans, operations, and activities across the Interagency from the Country Team’s Mission Strategic Plan to the Geographic Combatant Commander’s Theater Security Cooperation Plan and his War and Contingency Plans through the National Security Strategy of the United States. Plans must be nested and linked from the national to the tactical so resources, actions, and activities can be prioritized across all the departments. Attempts to codify a process have been made (e.g., PDD 56 The Management of Complex Contingency Operations during the Clinton Administration) but the system has not been disciplined enough to ensure adoption and compliance. Too often there are military planners writing war and contingency plans that require the full range of the instruments of National Power (Diplomacy, Information, Military, and Economic) with no input from the Interagency. Just imagine if the campaign plans developed for Iraq and Afghanistan had full participation by experts from the Interagency.

3. Establish a National Security Management Structure with authority and resources to discipline the National Security planning and execution process. This should be built around the National Security Council and the National Security Advisor. However, the term advisor will have to be changed (but not to Czar!!) to coincide with the duties, responsibilities, resources, and authorities it will require to lead, manage, and discipline the National Security system.² A working title might be the “Director of National Security.” Consideration should be given to appointing this person to a term along the lines of the Federal Reserve Chairman or the Director of the FBI to allow service (and continuity) beyond administrations perhaps with a fixed 10-year term. In addition, a Grand Strategy planning process looking out decades should also be considered as an integral part of any National Security Management Structure.³

4. Establish core education and training requirements to ensure the development of a cadre of National Security professionals within each Department that will allow them to take their functional department expertise and apply it to support the U.S. National Security mission. Additionally, within each department designated senior positions will require advanced National Security degrees for promotion and appointment to those positions. To effectively function as a National Security professional in today’s complex world the following attributes/skills must be developed by people within each department.

a. Ability to operate with broad guidance in complex situations. The military calls these “mission type” orders and operating within the Commander’s intent. Situations are both complex and fluid and require agile, critically thinking professionals who solve problems without waiting for the development of complete and complex plans from higher levels.

b. Capable of executing a common problem solving processes. All departments should adopt the “design methodology” that the Army and Joint Staff are developing because it is a creative problem identification, visualization, and solving process that requires effective collaboration to properly identify problems, develop creative solutions, and then agilely execute plans, actions, and activities in ever changing situations.⁴

c. Capable of conducting distributed operations in austere environments. This is crucial at the tactical level as this will be the most prevalent condition in which operations occur.

d. Tactical training must be built on outcome based training methodologies to provide experiential learning and support complex problem solving skills.

5. Simply, simplify, simplify. We have made a complex world more complex since 9-11. The proliferation of new terminology and concepts has caused confusion and difficulty in communicating among the Interagency. Calling Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism strategies is among the worst offenses. But as military and civilians alike struggle to name the conflict – from the Global War on Terror to the Long War to an Era of Persistent Conflict a tremendous amount of intellectual energy and capital is expended and does not contribute to problem solving. Furthermore for every problem, challenge, and issue identified a new concept with an accompanying organization, task force, command, agency, or department is established which often diverts resources (funds and personnel) from existing organizations that might be better able to solve the problem if empowered to do so.

In addition, for an effective National Security System to be instituted, Congress must revise the Security Assistance funding and authorities process to allow the national security apparatus to be responsive to the development of strategies and accompanying actions and activities to support those strategies.

Finally, the search for the “perfect solution” in terms of organization, training, education, lessons learned collection, concepts of employment and terminology hinders both effective operations and preparation for the future. There are two places where the Interagency process functions well – at the Country Team and on the ground in conflict areas. The men and women working overseas are getting it done despite a perceived unresponsive and inefficient National Security system. They have learned and adapted yet at the National and Strategic level there has been a lot of energy spent coming up with new ways to try to do old things and it has not helped the men and women on the ground. What is required is a national level system and processes that are simple, agile, and responsive to the challenges the U.S. faces. Ideally, the system will defend against the 3 historical failures in conflicts around the world – the failure to learn, the failure to adapt, and the failure to anticipate.⁵

The above 5 steps may provide the foundation for guidance for a National Security Act of 2009 that could provide the U.S. with a 21st Century National Security structure that would be able to effectively meet the National Security challenges in the era of persistent conflict.

Colonel David S. Maxwell, U.S. Army, is a Special Forces officer with command and staff assignments in Korea, Japan, Germany, the Philippines, and CONUS and is a graduate of the School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth and the National War College, National Defense University. The opinions he expresses in this paper are his own and represent no U.S. Government or Department of Defense positions.

1 Credit to Mr. Jim Locher who identified the problem that no agencies expect DoD has National Security as a core mission.

2 Credit again to Mr. Jim Locher who is working hard to solve this problem.

3 Thanks to COL Joe Celeski, USA (Ret) for this suggestion.

4 Design is an approach to critical and creative thinking that enables a commander to understand unique situations, to visualize and describe how to shape positive change across the operational environment. By its very nature, design is a fundamentally iterative activity, evolving with the dynamics of the operational environment. Design assists the commander in leading innovative, adaptive work and guides planning, execution and assessment – it facilitates the ability of the commander to frame complex, ambiguous problems and develop solutions that are flexible and adaptive to dynamic conditions. Design leverages organizational intellectual power into decisive combat power that can be used to manage ambiguous situations over time.

5 Eliot Cohen and John Gooch, *Military Misfortune*.

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