

**NDIA Trusted Microelectronics
Joint Working Group**

**Team 2:
Trustable Leading
Edge Technology Access**



JWG2 Team Members

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Goals for 2/2 NDIA Meeting



- **Share preliminary working group findings**
- **Gather input, including direction for focus and further development, for the final work product**
- **Collaborate with other working groups across domains**
- **Deliverables:**
 - Presentation at GOMAC, March 20, 2017, Reno, NV
 - White Paper, March 31, 2017

JWG2 Questions and Sub-Teams



- (1)Consequences:** What are the potential consequences of the Chinese Government's substantial global semiconductor investments to the U.S. commercial and defense microelectronics industrial base?
- (2)Impacts:** What are the economic and national security implications of losing access to reliable U.S. and non-U.S. foundries, manufactured components, equipment, intellectual property, and know how, for both commercial and Trusted handling levels?
- (3)Actions:** What actions (Industry and USG) could be taken to stabilize and sustain the U.S. defense microelectronics industrial base?

Our Sub-Teams:

Acquisition Reform

Aggregation Models

Trust Models


21st Century SoCs

End-to-End Education

National Policy
and Public-Private
Partnerships

- (1) Consequences
- (2) Impacts
- (3) Actions


End to End (E2E) Workflow **NDIA**



- (1) Consequences
- (2) Impacts
- (3) Actions

Global Market State of Play

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Note: Worldwide; 2014


Source: IHS; Website (businesskorea.co.kr); [ID 510374](#)

- US is global market leader (revenue)
 - Accounted for ½ of the global semiconductor sales over past 20 years
 - US companies earn the largest share of revenues in most critical areas
 - A little over 20 percent of global planned front end semiconductor fabs in 2017-2018 are owned by U.S. firms.
- US is losing domestic fab capacity
 - Share of world wide fab capacity in US fell to about 13% in 2015, down from 30% in 1990, and 42% in 1980
- Major Consolidation, Globalization:
 - Companies offering leading edge technology has recently consolidated to 4 companies.
 - Intel (U.S.), GLOBALFOUNDRIES (Abu Dhabi), Samsung (Korea), TSMC (Taiwan)
 - Driven by drastically increasing costs of production for advanced nodes
 - Increases the volumes major producers must sell to obtain return on investment (ROI)
 - Major semiconductor companies have increasing presence on multiple continents.

- (1) Consequences
- (2) Impacts
- (3) Actions

Commercial Foundation

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http://www.semiconductors.org/semiconductors/the_global_semiconductor_value_chain/

(1) Consequences

(2) Impacts

(3) Actions

Analogous Situations

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- **Japan**

- Trade and industrial actions in '70s & '80s to increase market share in semiconductor industry
- Largely successful, U.S. lost significant market share and fab capacity.
- SEMATECH formed, in part, to establish domestic capability in tools in light of these trends

- **Taiwan**

- Created ITRI in '70s, a government funded R&D Institute
- Spun off multiple companies, including TSMC
- Today has 4th largest segment of global market share and TSMC is world's largest Pure-Play Foundry.

- **China**

- In 2015, announced plan to reach “advanced world-level in all major segments of the industry by 2030.”
- Using the following tactics:
 - Subsidies
 - \$150 Billion over next 10 years, roughly size of US commercial industry average spending
 - Direct funding of state owned organizations (chiefly TsingHua Unigroup).
 - Subsidizing purchases of foreign companies and IP
 - Zero-Sum trade policies
 - Influencing domestic customers to only buy from Indigenous Chinese semiconductor suppliers
 - Lack of respect for IP rights
 - Significant Mergers and Acquisitions activities
- Current status:
 - Wafer foundries currently 2-3 generations behind in technology nodes (at 40nm in volume today, 28nm capability at SMIC planned by 2018)
 - No domestically owned memory producing commercial volume
 - Greatly increasing # of fabless firms, but no Tier 1 Equipment Firm




Technology Slow down due to sub-micron physical limitations provides an industry timeline gap to enable Chinese to rapidly advance.

- (1) Consequences
- (2) Impacts
- (3) Actions

Industry Trends Likely to Continue

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- **Trend towards fewer suppliers will likely continue**
 - Semiconductor Related Mergers and Acquisitions have accelerated in the past two years¹
 - 2010-2014 Average \$12.6B/year
 - 2014-2015 Average \$100.9B/year
 - “China’s goal of boosting its domestic semiconductor industry has added fuel to the M&A movement”¹
- **China’s share of worldwide capacity is anticipated to increase**
 - Growth to 15% of world wide capacity anticipated by 2021²



IC Insights: Global Wafer Capacity 2016-2020


- (1) <http://www.icinsights.com/news/bulletins/20152016-Deals-Dominate-Semiconductor-MA-Ranking/>
- (2) <http://www.semi.org/en/fab-investment-surge-china-0>

<https://goo.gl/nRWmPk>

- (1) Consequences
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Fab Source Option Space

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http://www.eetimes.com/document.asp?doc_id=1331002

Bold denotes foundry manufacturing providers

pure-play semiconductor foundries at leading edge (28nm and smaller)

Fabs being built

Derived from a chart originally from GSA

<https://goo.gl/nRWmPk>

Importance of IP at Advanced Nodes




- **Advanced nodes require advanced IP**
 - Technology features can not be leveraged without
 - Advanced IP typically carries longer lead times, higher cost than prior generations, and higher risk
- **Design migration / new designs in advanced nodes include increasingly complex IP / functionality to achieve greater capabilities (advantage)**
- **Leveraging commercially available IP is critical to DoD program schedules and cost control**
- **Re-creating advanced IP is not viable**
 - Costly, requires skilled critical resources, and adds significantly to project schedule and risk
- **Advanced node access MUST include access to leading edge commercial IP**
 - Funding
 - Countermeasures

“If You Want Commercial, You Need to Act/Buy Commercial”


- Fund and execute commercially aligned pathfinder/prototyping projects to train DoD acquisition workforce
 - Leverage DARPA and ASD(R&E) projects
- Develop DoD microelectronics projects in a manner leveraging commercial best practices for technology selection, development cycles, and funding profiles
 - Adopt commercial company mindset when developing requirements, verification, product life cycle forecasting and procurement, and cost efficiency
- Contract Commercially
 - Leverage OTA and/or FAR Chapter 12 to greatest extent possible to better align with the commercial market, minimize flow downs
 - Strategically change acquisition regulations to make it easier for the government and Primes to contract from commercial suppliers

Economies of Scale

- Increasing fab costs at advanced nodes means that semiconductor fabrication is now economically possible only at high manufacturing volumes
- Increased design costs means that Customer business cases favor high product volume solutions vs. niche products



Source: Bloomberg, BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research Estimates



Source: IBS

<http://semiengineering.com/how-much-will-that-chip-cost/>

Aggregation of Production

- **Aggregate Production of Mil/Aero and ASIC parts, with commercial semiconductor suppliers, is needed to increase volume**
- **Key Issue**
 - Volume is needed by microelectronics industry for a valid business case
 - TAPO aggregates DoD program specific programs and is a model that works for DoD
 - An aggregated solution, to support industrial production for catalog items, is also needed
- **Path for use of TAPO office for industrial production?**
 - Aggregate additional volume
 - Adopt policy or other regulations, for other critical infrastructure applications, to leverage supplier base
- **Defense Production Consortium Concept?**
 - Structured like MOSIS/ISI except for production
 - Focused totally on low volume
 - Multi-Project Wafers? Multi Layer Masks?
 - [National Cooperative Research and Production Act \(NCRPA\) of 1993](#)
 - Open to anyone who wants to order
 - Maybe have membership fee for consortium
 - Defense support (\$\$?) for “access”
 - Access to production partners and defense specific technologies (like RH)
 - Issues
 - Anti-Trust, NCRPA says that with approval you are not liable to treble damages, but
 - Can't structure consortium to damage the business of foundries

Aggregation of EDA S/W and IP



- **Key Issue – low volume reduces the ability to obtain EDA S/W and IP (Mil/Aero)**
 - Organizations that can't do design "at scale" incur exponential costs
- **Proposed concept of USG (or Service/Agency) wide licensing isn't a solution**
 - Although intramural R&D wants to get access to EDA/IP, that is not the problem
 - Mil/Aero Microelectronics Industry is being priced out of EDA/IP access
 - EDA/IP unlikely to license to entire M/A Microelectronics industry (dual use)
- **Two potential approaches: (1) Defense Design Consortium, and (2) Defense Design Centers of Excellence**
- **Defense Design Consortium**
 - Members join (for a fee)
 - Consortium licenses EDA/IP from commercial vendors
 - Maintains a Trusted IP library, accessible to all members
 - Members assign staff to the Consortium to do designs on Consortium capabilities
 - Maintains a Trusted IP library, accessible to all members
- **Defense Design Centers of Excellence**
 - Defense support for one or more industrial centers (supports EDA/IP from commercial vendors)
 - Industry subcontracts with center to design and/or jointly design new products
- **Would these business models work for commercial EDA and IP providers?**

21st Century SoC Requirements

Are DoD System on Chip (SoC) requirements changing for advanced nodes?

- SOCs include Digital, RF, Mixed Signal, or mix-and-match applications
- DoD SoC requirements include unique requirements above commercial, such as
 - military temp. range, hermetically sealed packages, reliability, radiation tolerance
 - Unique security and trust requirements
- **No new or additional DoD requirements, above and beyond commercial, were identified specifically for advanced node applications**
- **However, it has become more difficult at advanced nodes to maintain the same requirements due to the following factors:**
 - Commercial Pace of Technology Development
 - Increase in node design complexity
 - Increase in integrated functionality and 3rd party IP content
 - Increase in thermal density
 - Distribution of end to end workflow elements to world wide suppliers



21st Century SoC - Ideas to Consider

- **Align with commercial specifications**
 - Mil temp and high reliability – align with Automotive specs?
- **Align with commercial “building blocks”**
 - Architecturally, leverage commercial investments, with overlay of assurance approaches
- **Align with commercial tools and standards**
 - Don’t re-invent it for the DoD...
- **Move system architecture standards to SOC implementations**
 - Recognize these chips are systems on chips
- **Adopt security practices from commercial industry**
 - High security requirements for certain commercial applications – can they be adopted?
- **Promote a business model and culture for assured re-use across disparate programs and commonality for scale**

Trust and Security

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
- **Trusted sourcing for mission critical integrated circuits is required per DoD policy 5200.44**
- **Trusted accredited suppliers, under the current Trust criteria, do not exist for nodes below 32nm**
- **Various Countermeasure techniques are being developed, by DARPA and others, to achieve security across end to end workflow elements**
- **A/CM analysis techniques could lead to a more nuanced approach for application of sufficient security at each step in the end to end flow**
 - Accounts for supplier workflow element risk analysis
 - Accounts for program level application of countermeasures
- **A new approach in how we achieve security could open up access while satisfying security – achieving availability of advanced technologies to DoD programs**



- (1) Consequences
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Systems Engineering Approach

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Dr. Jeremy Muldavin Office of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Systems Engineering (DASD(SE))

New Trust Model Goals?




- **Today's options**
 - Use existing Trusted accredited suppliers for end to end workflow elements available
 - Not all end to end workflow elements are available Trusted
 - Obtain a waiver to 5200.44 via a program protection plan for a specific program
 - Discouraged / not supported today and requires extensive effort/time
- **Potential for a New Process to address the following elements:**
 - End to End workflow element Attack vulnerability assessment
 - End to End workflow element countermeasure assessment
 - Data base for results
 - Program level assessment means
 - This could enable optimal selection of available and secure end to end flow elements for each program


E2E Workflow Vulnerability Assessment **NDIA**

- Evaluation of attacks that could be executed across the ASIC development lifecycle provides insight into areas of particular vulnerability.
- Application of countermeasures, trust, or both, can improve assurance of devices, and target assurances

Attack Families Applied to ASIC Lifecycle




Improving **Integrity** in ASIC Lifecycle



- (1) Consequences
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Sketch of Trust Assessment Tool **NDIA**



Need for a National Strategy

- **The U.S. currently has no national manufacturing strategy for semiconductors; ideally such a policy would encompass:**
 - Research
 - Strategic investment
 - Measures to mitigate the high costs of serving the defense market
 - IP protection
 - Tax Policies
 - Public-Private Partnerships
- **In contrast, China has adopted a five year plan and partnerships with Regions and localities with very specific goals:**
 - Manufacture 70% of country's demand by 2025
 - Investing \$100–\$150 Billion over next 10 years to buy, collaborate, and obtain capabilities
 - \$ 70B investment for advanced Memory Fabs in 2017
- **Public-private partnerships have been successful in advancing public and private technology development goals and should be considered further**

Public-Private Partnerships

- **Public-private Partnerships serve to:**
 - Provide commercial industry access to manufacturing infrastructure, toolsets and possibly IP for pre-A and A round investments
 - Provide USG access to technologies at the leading edge and those that are not otherwise commercially viable
 - Mitigate financial risk for commercial industry
 - Create jobs and provide economic stability
- **PPPs can be sustained by a diverse revenue stream, including:**
 - Public Grants
 - R&D contracts, public or private
 - Membership fees
 - IP licensing revenue
- **There are many past and present examples of successful public-private partnerships in semiconductor and other technology heavy industries.**
 - IMEC (Belgium), ITRI (Taiwan), A*Star (Singapore), Sematech (U.S.)
 - Manufacturing USA (NNMI) attempting this for manufacturing in general. Could be leveraged to benefit the semiconductor industry (<https://www.manufacturing.gov/nnmi/>)
 - Expanding beyond two current semi-focused manufacturing institutes is possible tool

Public-Private Partnership Recommendations



- We endorse the trade, tax and intellectual property rights high-level recommendations made by the recent PCAST Working Group on Semiconductors.
- We also recommend:
 - Establish Public-Private Partnerships to support manufacturing learning and intellectual property development:
 - Technology Acceleration Initiatives focused on specific challenges, such as materials development and integration
 - Shared Facilities for prototype development, testing & validation, low volume production for USG and accelerate development of anti-tamper measures
 - Create environment for broad demand for trustable microelectronics to increase demand and lower the cost
 - Critical industrial infrastructure applications such as autonomous vehicles, finance, air traffic control systems, and defense systems

Q&A Session



We value your interaction today!

Please provide any additional feedback with the form: <https://goo.gl/nRWmPk>

Please Vote for areas that you request this group to focus on: <https://goo.gl/5zOWsG>