

Cybersecurity for Advanced Manufacturing: Understanding the Digital Thread

Presented to: NDIA's Cybersecurity for Advanced Manufacturing Forum

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NDIA White Paper

Protecting the Digital Thread



Promoting National Security Since 1919

CYBERSECURITY FOR ADVANCED MANUFACTURING

a
White Paper
prepared by
National Defense Industrial Association's
Manufacturing Division
and
Cyber Division

May 5, 2014

Manufacturing Concerns:

- Theft of technical info -- can compromise national defense and economic security
- Alteration of technical data -- can alter the part or the process, with physical consequences to mission and safety
- Disruption or denial of process control -- can shut down production

***A risk management problem.
Need resilience!***

www.ndia.org/Divisions/Divisions/Manufacturing

Government and industry members of the CFAM JWG collaborate to build on recommendations in the 2014 NDIA white paper, *Cybersecurity for Advanced Manufacturing*

- Identify cybersecurity vulnerabilities in the manufacturing environment and mitigations . . . *types and boundaries, highest impact near-term actions, culture changes*
- Identify ways to incentivize and assist manufacturers to improve cybersecurity in manufacturing systems . . . *policies and contract requirements, security practices, workforce cybersecurity training*
- Develop implementation plans . . . *coordinated with government and industry groups*

Focus Area

NDIA

“Safeguarding Covered Defense Information
and Cyber Incident Reporting”
DFARS SUBPART 204.73

“Network Penetration”
DFARS 252.204-7008
and 252.204-7012

Multiple descriptions of covered
information exist, including:


Covered Defense Information (CDI)

Unclassified Controlled Technical
Information (UCTI)

Controlled Technical Information
(CTI)

Controlled Unclassified Information
(CUI)

For our study, we have used CDI as a
standard nomenclature.



Focus on:

- Operational technology networks and interfaces, not IT or enterprise networks
- Manufacturing cyber environment, not general cybersecurity

Operational Technology (OT) vs. IT

What's Different?



- **ICS systems are long-lived capital investments (15-20 year life)**
 - Obsolete operating systems and software are common
 - New systems architected for security, but hard to interoperate with old
- **“Production mindset” with little tolerance for OT down time**
 - Operate in real time with critical safety implications – cannot install patches without scheduled downtime and testing
 - Weak privilege management among operators and maintainers. Growing use of wireless devices.
 - Nascent cybersecurity awareness and limited workforce training.
- **Manufacturing differs from other ICS applications (e.g. Power Grid)**
 - Every manufacturing job brings new executable code into system
 - Tech data flowing through the system is a target



Industry Week Photo

- **Manufacturing is an increasingly digital business**

- Smart Manufacturing
- Industrial Internet of Things
- Industry 4.0
- ...

- **Advanced Manufacturing is:**

- Networked at every level to gain efficiency, speed, quality and agility
- Constantly learning from models and data throughout the life cycle
- Driven by a “Digital Thread” of product and process information
 - Source of competitive advantage for manufacturers and their customers
 - Source of military advantage for DoD
 - Demands protection throughout the product lifecycle
- Has a “Digital Twin” (models and simulations) used to mirror and predict activities and performance of processes and products

NDIA Division Representation



Cyber

Dawn Beyer
Lockheed Martin Corporation

James Godwin
BriteWerx, Inc

Jason Gorey
Six O'Clock Ops

Michele Moss
Booz Allen Hamilton

Fran Zenzen
Arizona State Enterprise

Manufacturing

Dean Bartles
ASME

Larry John
ANSER

Michael McGrath
McGrath Analytics LLC

Catherine Ortiz
Defined Business Solutions

Chris Peters
The Lucrum Group

Tim Shinbara
The Association for
Manufacturing Technology

Devu Shila
United Technologies
Research Center

Joseph Spruill
Lockheed Martin Corp

Rebecca Taylor
Nat'l Center for
Mfg. Sciences

Systems Engineering

Vicki Barbur
MITRE

David Huggins
Georgia Tech Research Institute

Thomas McCullough
Lockheed Martin Corporation

Thomas McDermott
Georgia Tech Research Institute

Heather Moyer (Team Leader)
Consultant

Frank Serna
Draper

Sarah Stern (Team Leader)
Boeing

Logistics

Marilyn Gaska (Team Leader)
Lockheed Martin Corp

Irv Varkonyi
SCOPE

CFAM JWG is a Diverse Team



48 participants: Government, Academia, Industry, Associations and FFRDCs

- **Government organizations:**

- DoD Undersecretary for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics
- DoD Chief Information Officer
- Department of the Army
- Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command
- Air Force Research Laboratory
- Department of Energy
- National Institute of Standards and Technology
- Defense Microelectronics Activity
- Manufacturing Technology ODASD (MIBP)
- Defense Intelligence Agency
- Idaho National Laboratory

- **FFRDCs:**

- Institute for Defense Analyses
- MITRE
- Sandia National Laboratories

- **Industry member organizations:**

- National Defense Industrial Association (lead)
- American Society of Mechanical Engineers
- Association for Enterprise Information
- Association for Manufacturing Technology
- National Center for Manufacturing Sciences


- **Industry company representation:**

- ANSER
- ARAR Technology
- Boeing
- Booz Allen Hamilton
- Defined Business Solutions LLC
- DRAPER
- GLOBALFOUNDRIES
- IPDE Systems, Inc.
- Lockheed Martin
- McGrath Analytics LLC
- MTEQ
- PricewaterhouseCoopers
- Six O’Clock Ops
- SCOPE
- The Lucrum Group
- United Technologies Research Center

- **Academia:**

- Arizona State University Research Enterprise
- Georgia Tech Research Institute
- Wichita State University

The Digital Thread as DoD sees It



Requirements
Analysis

Research and
Engineering
Development

Test and
Evaluation

Production

Training

Sustainment

Maintenance


Product Lifecycle

DIGITAL THREAD


Corporate Functions and Network

Facilities Inventory
Procurement Personnel
Financial Programs
Marketing R&D


Major Manufacturer



Production ICS OEM




Research
Data



R&D Laboratory

Research
Data



Smaller Supplier

Design, Production and
Administrative Data

	Cyber Defenses	
	Perimeter	Interior
Major Manufacturer	Strong	Strong
Smaller Supplier (Cleared)	Medium	Medium
Smaller Supplier (Uncleared)	Weak	Weak
Production ICS OEM	Weak	None
R&D Laboratory	Weak	None

1	Product Data
2	Process Data
3	Production Status
4	Process Performance
5	Product Status
6	Product Test Data

Manufacturers' Production Functions and Network

Level 2 (Monitoring/Supervising Production)

Level 1 (Sensing/Manipulating Production)

Level 0 (Production Process)

Production
Scheduling

Production
Control

Material
and Energy
Control

Quality
Assurance

Product
Inventory
Control

Product
Shipping
Administration

Maintenance
Management

R&D and
Engineering

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
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
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
Major Manufacturer



Production ICS OEM



Research
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


R&D Laboratory

Research
Data

Confidentiality
Use Case Attacks

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
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
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
Major Manufacturer



Production ICS OEM



Research
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


R&D Laboratory

Research
Data

Integrity
Use Case Attacks

Design, Production and
Administrative Data



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Production ICS OEM

ICS Products
and Services
Corporate
Functions and
Network

Research
Data

Research
Products
Corporate
Functions and
Network

R&D Laboratory

Major Manufacturer

Production Functions
and Network
Corporate Functions
and Network

Research
Data

Availability
Use Case Attacks

Design, Production and
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and Network
Corporate Functions
and Network

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
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R&D and
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
The Digital Thread is Vulnerable

NDIA


Confidentiality



Integrity



Availability



- Insiders can do recon and data exfiltration or alter design or process control files
- Insecure external/internal communications can be exploited to steal design data
- Sensors embedded in equipment can contain malware
- Visitors and contractors may have extensive or unsupervised access to software, firmware and hardware
- Tainted firmware from supply chain can contain sophisticated malware
- HVAC systems can be used to alter the process environment to damage/destroy products

Threat Types

- Adversarial
- Accidental
- Structural
- Environmental

Vulnerability Types

- Policy and Procedure
- Architecture and Design
- Configuration Management
- Physical
- Software Development
- Communication and Network

NIST 800-82 rev. 2

Large companies may be OK on their own, but what about the small and mid-size firms that may be connected to the big companies?

- Often lack cybersecurity knowledge and resources. Most have no full time cybersecurity staff
 - *ISA99 Standards and NIST SP 800-82 are complex. No turnkey solutions.*
 - *Forums available to large companies are often beyond their reach – e.g. DIB CS/IA Program requires facility clearance and COMSEC account*
 - *Cannot afford differing cybersecurity requirements from different customers*
- **Believe they are not targets, so they focus on perimeter defense for IT network**
 - *Lack of compartmentalization despite standards calling for discrete zones and conduits*
 - *Vulnerable to OEM backdoors, default passwords, discoverable IP addresses, connection by portable devices, connection from outside networks*

May simply lack a business case for investing in OT cybersecurity

- **Each working group will present their findings and recommendations . . . comments from today will be incorporated into final white paper**
- **Website will continued to be updated on NDIA portal . . . found under Industrial Working Groups**
- **Outreach plan developed to share progress . . . first public forum was in August, this second forum is to share findings; CFAM session at DMC on November 29th**
- **Goal is to brief senior OSD leadership in December 2016 . . . Formal report will be coordinated within DoD, and other government agencies as appropriate, after new leadership team is in place**